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LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF ENTRY
FISHERY MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION*
Limited entry' management attempts to regulate fisheries2 by inte-
grating economic data with biological data to develop programs that
avoid both depletion of stocks3 and economic waste. The dual aim of
* Part of this study was done in cooperation with the National Marine Fisheries
Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, United States Dep't. of
Commerce, under Contract Number 03-4-043-358. The assistance of N. Bartlett
Theberge, Assistant Professor of Ocean Law, Virginia Institute of Marine Science
and Ivar E. Strand, Jr., Marine Resource Economist, Virginia Institute of Marine
Science was most helpful in the preparation of this paper. The views expressed within
are those of the author alone.
-1. Limited entry is a term of art referring to fishery management programs that use
economic models to determine, on the basis of biological and economic inputs, how
the fishery stocks can be maintained with the optimal level of capital and labor. The
purpose is both to reduce exploitation of the fishery stocks and to avoid economic
waste in the fishing industry. For analysis of the economic theory, see F. CmusTY,
ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAuNE FisHamEs: AN OvERWEw (1973) (prepared
for Resources for the Future Program of International Studies of Fishery Arrange-
ments, RFF/PISFA Paper 1) [hereinafter cited as F. CHRISTY, ALTERNATIVE ARANGF-
mENTS]; Copes, The Backward-Bending Supply Curve of the Fishing Industry, 17
Scar. J. PoLIT. EcoN. 69 (1970); Gordon, The Econo"1ic Theory of a Common-
Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. PoLrr. EcoN. 124 (1954); Scott, The Fishery:
The Objective of Sole Ownership, 63 J. PoLiT. EcoN. 116 (1955).
2. This paper will use the term "fishing" to refer to all forms of harvesting of
marine species, whether finfish or shellfish. "Fisherman" will be used to represent
any participants in a fishing industry. "Fishing industry" will be used to designate the
commercial enterprise involved in harvesting fisheries.
3. Extracting at a rate greater than the rate at which stocks replenish themselves
results in depletion of the fishery. See House Comam. ON MFRCHANT MARNE AND
FISHERiES, MARINE FisHrERiEs CONSERVATION Acr OF 1975, H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 36 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 94-445]. The
report lists marine fishery resources that are depleted, in imminent danger of depletion,
or under intensive use. Id. at 95-98. See also F. CmusTY & A. ScoTt, TmE COMmONwEALTH
rN OcEAN FIsHERIEs 9 (1965).
4. Economic waste results from investing more capital or labor in a fishery than is
needed to harvest the amount that is landed. For example, in 1965 the cod fishery in
the North Atlantic was so overutilized that the same catch could have been landed
with 10% to 20% less fishing effort than was employed, at an estimated saving of 50
to 100 million dollars per year. F. CnHsry, ALTEmATrs AaANGEmENT , supra note 1,
at 17. A study of the Pacific salmon fisheries in the mid-1960s indicated that the same
annual catch and total revenues could have been achieved with about 50 million dollars
less capital and labor than was used. J. CRuTCHFmL & G. PONTECORvo, THE PACIFIe
SALMON FIsHERIs: A STUDY OF IRRATIONAL CONSERVATION 174 (1969).
Economic waste results because entry is free. As new investment is attracted to a
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efficiently utilizing both natural resources and the resources of the
fishing industry distinguishes limited entry management from traditional
fishery management, which has had the single biological goal of main-
taining the maximum sustainable yield (MSY).'
Exploitation of fisheries and economic waste occur in open access
fisheries because there is insufficient incentive for the participants to
limit their investment. A common property status exists;" no single
user of a fishery has exclusive rights, nor can any single user prevent
others from entering. 7 Each fisherman knows that if he abstains in the
present, his rivals will not, and thus the benefits of his individual
abstention will be neutralized. Also, any reduction in future costs as
a result of present abstention accrues to everyone, not just the abstainer.
This doubly penalizes the abstainer because the apparent result of his
inaction is to lower competitors' future costs at some immediate present
cost to himself.8 Even though economic waste and accelerated deple-
tion of the stocks results from open access fishing, the fisherman is
compelled by the common property status to invest and reap his profits
now, and to postpone consideration of stock depletion and its resultant
decline in revenues.' Because the common property nature of the fish-
ery is the source of stock depletion and economic waste, limited entry
management seeks to restructure the legal nature of fisheries.
Limited entry entails restricting the amount of fishing that may be
done in a commons by excluding fishermen or placing restraints on their
operations. Enclosure of a commons, however, inevitably raises claims
that there exists a denial of equal protection or due process of law, or a
fishery, greater pressure is put on a limited supply. The returns to capital and labor
will decrease and the extra profits, or economic rents that could have been used for
other development activities will be dissipated. Limited entry management seeks to
avoid economic waste by limiting the number of participants in a fishery to the eco-
nomically efficient maximum, and to recapture for society the lost economic rents. It
is the recapture of the rents that benefits society. See notes 64 & 67 infra.
5. W. RoycE, INTRODUCTION TO THE FISHERY SCIENCES 519 (1972). "MSY" means the
maximum yield at which the stocks can be maintained indefinitely. It is, therefore,
a ceiling on fishing; the stocks can reproduce themselves at a take less than MSY, but
beyond MSY, reduction in stocks begins.
6. Clingan, A Second Look at United States Fisheries Management, 9 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 432, 443-44 (1972); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Conrmons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968); Kratchman, The Rise and Fall of Natural Resource Systems, 8 LAND AND
VATER L. REV. 429, 431-32 (1973).
7. F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE CO*mmONWEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 6 (1965).
8. Sweeney, Tollison & Willctt, Market Failure, the Common-Pool Problem, and
Ocean Resource Exploitation, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 179, 183-84 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Sweeney].
9. Sweeney, supra note 8, at 183-84.
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"taking" prohibited by the fifth amendment of the Constitution.1" This
Note will present a brief overview of these claims and examine in more
detail the constitutional implications" of three alternative methods of
limited entry.12 Examination of these methods also will entail consid-
eration of whether the legal ramifications of limited entry differ from
the widely accepted regulation of other businesses'3 and of natural re-
sources.'4 To place limited entry in context, this discussion must be
prefaced by a brief outline of the jurisdictional framework of fishery
management.
JURISDICTION FOR FISHERY MANAGEMENT
Natural resources are controlled by the governing unit, state or
federal, for the benefit of its citizens.'5 The power to regulate for the
10. As one commentator has observed:
Every new enclosure of the commons involves the infringement of some-
body's personal liberty. Infringements made in the distant past are accepted
because no contemporary complains of a loss. It is the newly proposed in-
fringements that we vigorously oppose; cries of "rights" and "freedom" fill
the air. But what does "freedom" mean? When men mutually agreed to pass
laws against robbing, mankind became more free, not less so. Individuals
locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal
ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion, they become free to
pursue other goals. I believe it was Hegel who said, "Freedom is the
recognition of necessity."
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Coimnons, 162 SCIENcE 1243, 1248 (1968).
11. See also Note, The Constitutionality of a Program Restricting the Numzber of
Commercial Fishermen in the Coastal lVaters of the United States, 34 LA. L. Rav. 801
(1974).
12. It is important to note that all fishing management, including limited entry,
must be tailored to specific fisheries and fishing industries. Individual fisheries have
different characteristics that make discussion of abstract management proposals difficult
and somewhat unsatisfactory. Aoreover, particular fisheries may be best regulated by
a hybrid utilization of different management programs. Because limited entry legislation
must reflect the individualized characteristics of the regulated fishery, a model statute
has not been suggested. Rather, this Note examines three alternative methods of
limited entry and their constitutional ramifications.
13. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 US. 483 (1955); EDay-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
14. See, e.g., Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); Miller v.
McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261 (1930); LaCoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545
(1924); Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1060 (D. XMd. 1972); Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md.), aff'd, 355 U.S. 37
(1957). Because limited entry legislation has the dual purposes of conservation of re-
sources and control of an economic enterprise it is necessary to look to precedents
-in both areas of the law.
15. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 75 (1941); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133, 139 (1894). On jurisdiction generally, see H. KNicirr & T. JACKS N, LEGAL IM-
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protection or preservation of resources may be found in the police
power to act for the general welfare,'" or in the concept of the public
trust.'7 The authority to restrict access exists in the government with
jurisdiction over the fishery, but the jurisdictional framework currently
is undergoing changes. The states have jurisdiction over resources found
inland and to the three mile limit;' the contiguous federal zone, cur-
rently from three to twelve miles,19 will be extended to two hundred
miles in March 1977 when the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 197620 takes effect. 21 This extended jurisdiction will enable
management of species now fishedby international fleets.22 The statute
anticipates the use of limited entry plans for management,2 but empha-
sizes conservation of the resource and biological goals over economic
analysis.24
PEDIMENTS TO THE USE OF- INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS IN COORDINATED FISHERIES MANAGE-
MENT PROGRAMS: STATES IN THE N.M.F.S. SOUTHEAST REGION, (Louisiana State Uni-
versity, Office of Sea Grant Development, Sea Grant Legal Program 1973) [herein-
after cited as KNIGHT & JACKSON].
16. See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Sloup v. Town of Islip, 78
Misc. 2d 366, 356 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Gov-
ernor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972); Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 64 A.2d
547 (1949); Grossman v. Hotel Astor, 166 Misc. 80, 1 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Mun. Ct. 1937);
State v. Price, 71 N.J.L. 249, 58 A. 1015 (1904).
17. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 556, 559 (1970). See also, KNIGHT & JACKSON, supra
note 15, at 32-34.
18. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
19. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
20. Pub. L. No. 94-265 (April 13, 1976), quoted in 122 CONG. REc. S4485 (daily ed.
March 29, 1976).
21. Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 104, quoted in 122 CONG. REC. S4486 (daily ed. March 29,
1976).
22. The share of catch in certain areas reflects the impact of foreign fishing:
1960 1972 1974
(%) (%) (%)
Total U.S. Atlantic coast U.S. 92.9 49.1 50.0
Foreign 7.1 50.9 50.0
Georges Bank (Northern U.S. 88.0 10.4 11.4
New England, Cod, Haddock) Foreign 12.0 89.6 88.6
Southern New England U.S. 100.0 11.8 26.4
Foreign 0 88.2 73.6
H.R. RaP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1975).
23. Pub. L. No. 94-265, §§ 301(a)(1), (4); 303(b)(6); 304(c)(3),'quoted in 122
CONG. Rac. S4489 to S4491 (daily ed. March 29, 1976).
24. Compare Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 3(18), with id. § 301 (a) (5). Compare id.
S 301(a) (1), (2), 'with id. § (5), (7). It is unclear precisely what role economic theory
will play in the formulation of management plans under the standards enumerated in
section 301.
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With respect to inland fishing it must be noted that because fish
rarely confine themselves to single political jurisdictions the present
diffusion of authority is not a political atmosphere conducive to effec-
tive management. In an effort to avoid federal preemption, various
jurisdictional means, such as interstate compacts26 and cooperative re-
gional management councils, 27 have been used, but structuring manage-
ment programs of this nature is difficult and time consuming.28 More-
over, individual state efforts are often limited by state constitutional
constraints29 as well as by potential challenges under the commerce
clause30 and the privileges and immunities clause3' of the Constitution.
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1975).
26. For example, New Jersey and Delaware have joined in a compact on fishing
in the Delaware River and Bay. DEL. CODE AN., Tit. 7, §§ 902-03 (1974). The Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Compact is composed of most of the Atlantic states. See, e.g.,
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:21-1 to 21-11 (1963). On the usefulness of interstate compacts
for limited entry fishery management see KNIGHT & JACKSON, supra note 15, at 47-63-
J. DAVIS, N. TIIEBERGE, M. STRAND, N. BoCKSTAEL & J. GATES, ALTERNATiVE MANAGE-
MENT SCHEMES FOR THE SURF CLAM FISHERY, (1975) (special report in Applied Marine
Science and Ocean Engineering No. 103, Virginia Inst. of Marine Science) [herein-
after cited as ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT SCHEMES FOR SURF CLAMS].
27. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Commerce, utilizes regional
marine fisheries councils based on geography and encourages fishery management
through these organizations. The regional councils are designated: 1. New England
2. Mid-Atlantic 3. Southern Atlantic 4. Caribbean 5. Gulf 6. Pacific 7. North Pacific
8. Western Pacific. See Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 302, H.R. 200, 94th Cong, 2d Sess.
(1976), quoted in 122 CONG. REc. S4489 (daily ed. March 29, 1976).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-30 (1975). The problem is that
where a management unit transcends political boundaries to focus on regional prob-
lems, it must return to the localities to effect implementation. State legislatures or
state management -agencies must act to put the program into effect. Because state
legislatures are in session at different times, programs cannot be implemented quickly.
State fishery agencies also have varying rulemaking and enforcement powers. Any
cooperative management plan that relies on state implementation must resolve the
problems presented by such diversity in constructing a successful program.
29. See Note 65 infra. See, e.g., F. CAMERON, STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL IM-
PEDIMENTS TO STATE LIMITED ENTRY FISHERIES LEGISLATION: STATES FROM MAINE TO
VIRGINIA, (Marine Affairs Program, Univ. R.I., 1973) [hereinafter cited as CAMERON].
30. U.S. Co.sr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,
120 U.S. 489 (1887).
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. State fisheries management plans that have
sought to exclude nonresident fishermen have been struck down as unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (invalidating an attempt to'regulate
the South Carolina shrimp fishery by charging residents a $25 license fee and non-
residents a $2500 license fee); Brown v. Anderson, 202 F. Supp. 96 (D. Alas. 1962)
(Alaska closure of fishing areas to nonresidents violated the privileges and immunities
clause and--impacted on the commerce clause by burdening the movement of nonresi-
dent fishermen in interstate commerce).
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Although there is ample legal support for federal preemption2 of
state fishery management, 3 centralization is not the best answer to the
jurisdictional problem. Because of the varying characteristics of indi-
vidual fisheries, regulation would be best handled by a local or regional
approach, 4 for despite the problems of framing a suitable jurisdictional
unit, it is important to retain choices to fit the sundry needs of par-
ticular fisheries. Whatever the jurisdiction selected, however, limited
entry management must be carefully structured to avoid challenges of
constitutional impropriety.
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY THEORY OF
LIMITED ENTRY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The government clearly can act to protect its natural resources; and
conservation by way of prohibition of all taking is an accepted mode
of resource protection.35 The power to enact the total prohibition, how-
ever, does not automatically mean that the lesser restriction, limiting
the activity, passes constitutional muster. A total prohibition on taking
a resource has an equal effect on all, while partial prohibition such as
32. The power for federal preemption is found in the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533 (1944) (regulation of insurance companies); Thornton v. United States, 271
U.S. 414 (1926) (quarantine of diseased cattle); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)
(federal prohibition of transportation in interstate commerce of lottery tickets);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (state law prohibiting vessels licensed
by the United States from navigating state waters invalidated); United States v. Bishop
Proc. Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968). Under the "affectation doctrine," even
intrastate fishery activities would come within commerce clause jurisdiction because
of a substantial impact on interstate commerce. See, e.g, Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate credit transactions ["loansharking"] subject to federal
control); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat grown for home consump-
tion affects interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (federal
minimum wage and maximum hours law upheld).
33. In Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), the court held that even the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970), giving the states management
jurisdiction.to three miles, did not deprive the federal government of its inherent
power to manage all United States waters.
34. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-.380 (1973); WASH. RV. CODE §§ 75.28.450-
.485 (1974).
35. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-668cc-6 (1970)
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, Dec. 28, 1973) (prohibits importation of fish or
wildlife which Secretary of Interior has determined to be threatened with worldwide
extinction); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat.
1027 et seq. (prohibits importation of products from certain protected marine mam-
mals); Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 42-44 (forbids transportation or sale of any wildlife
taken in violation of any foreign, federal or state law or regulation).
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limited entry may not affect all equally. The potential for unequal
treatment forces a closer examination of potential constitutional
challenges.
As noted previously, a limited entry program is subject to at least
three constitutional challenges. The equal protection clause challenge
would assert that the method by which access to the fishery is allocated
unreasonably discriminates among the persons willing to participate"
The due process claim would allege that liberty (the right to fish) or
property (the fish or fishing gear) 37 was being taken without satisfying
due process standards. The takings claim is a variant of due process; the
fisherman would assert that the regulatory scheme resulted in a taking
of his property for public use without compensation. These theories
will be evaluated separately.
Equal Protection
Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, a
classification will be held constitutional if it is reasonable and rests
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alikeY Under this two-tiered "rational basis" test the classi-
fication in question is rebuttably presumed to be constitutional; 9 the
state is given great latitude in proving reasonableness. 40 Mere reason-
ableness, however, will not support a suspect classification4' or one
which affects a fundamental interest.4 Such a classification is subject
36. The Alaska Limited Entry program discussed infra, is currently under challenge
on these grounds. See note 72 infra & accompanying text.
37. But see Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (seizure and destruction of pro-
hibited nets was held to be valid).
38. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
40. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The two-tiered test
remains viable despite recent criticisms. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 116 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gunther, The Su-
premne Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for A Never Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rxv. 1, 20-21 (1972).
41. Cases finding or strongly intimating that suspect classifications were under re-
view include: Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin).
42. Those interests arguably declared "fundamental" by the Supreme Court include:
voting, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); marriage, see
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); procreation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); rights in the
19761
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to "strict scrutiny"; the state bears a far heavier burden of justifica-
don, for it must prove that the classification is "necessary, and not
merely related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." "
The presumption of validity arising under the rational basis test is not
applicable."
Limited entry should not involve any suspect class or fundamental
rights.45 Occupational choice, although an important right or privilege,
is not so fundamental as to place upon the state the burden of proving
that government-imposed access qualifications are more than rationally
related to the purposes they are instituted to subserve.46 Moreover, in
cases involving economic regulation or resource management, the courts
have shown a great willingness to ratify legislative evaluations of pro-
grams designed to serve the public welfare;4 7 as a rule, statutory classi-
fications will not be set aside if any facts reasonably may be conceived
in justification. 48 Limited entry is a legitimate way of achieving the goal
of maintaining fishery resources and an economically sound fishing
industry, so that as long as the allocation of access to the fishery is based
on reasonable classifications of potential entrants,4" equal protection
should be satisfied.50
criminal process, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); interstate travel, see Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
43. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
45. Limited entry, as an economic and resource control regulation, should not trigger
strict scrutiny unless the classifications are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Only
the tax alternative for limited entry carries a significant potential for strict scrutiny;
see note 103 infra & accompanying text.
46. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Villiamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955).
47. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), the Court stated:
[In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does
not offend the Constitution simply because [it] "is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). "The prob-
lems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific."
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913).
48. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). But cf. Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rxv. 1 (1972).
49. See note 76 infra & accompanying text for a discussion of Alaska limited entry
program.
50. In light of the apparent ease with which a statute can pass the equal protection
[Vol. 17:757
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Due Process
It is unlikely that limited entry would be held violative of the due
process clause.5 ' Generally, great deference is given to the legislature to
formulate programs regulating economic affairs; 2 courts are reluctant
to hand down decisions that carry the tinge of "substantive due
process." 53 And with respect to occupational licensing, where such
regulations have been struck down under the applicable rational basis
test, the right to work element often has been less significant than some
infringement of a first amendment guarantee.54
Legislation with the effect of eliminating a commercial fishery has
test, it is useful to analyze a case in which the Supreme Court used equal protection
language to invalidate a fishery management program. In Puyallup Tribe v. Washing-.
ton Game Dep't, 414 U.S. 44 (1973), the Washington game department had prohibited
net (commercial) fishing of steelhead trout on the Puyallup River to protect the
stocks and the line (sport) fishery in steelhead. Indian net (commercial) fishermen
challenged the program, alleging a denial of equal protection because the only net
fishermen were Indians; all sport fishermen were non-Indian. In addition, the Indians,
pursuant to an 1852 treaty, had reserved off-reservation fishing rights; such rights, they
asserted, left them immune from state regulation. The Court held that Indians were
subject to state regulation just like other citizens, but stated that when fishing regula-
tions impacted on treaty rights, the state had to show that the regulations were abso-
lutely necessary, that the resource otherwise could not be protected. Because of the
treaty rights, stated the Court, the Indians composed a special class, with a greater
right to fish than other persons. Puyallup is not, therefore, an ordinary equal pro-
tection case, In most cases there is no special right that would force the state to meet
a greater burden of justifying fishery regulation than the standard rational relationship
test.
For a full discussion of the 1852 treaty and the conflict between off-reservation fish-
ing rights and state regulatory powers, see United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.
312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), in which Indian tribes, including the Puyallup, successfully
enjoined enforcement of Washington fishery regulations (including the steelhead
trout regulations) on the basis of their treaty rights.
51. Procedural due process, covering adequate notice, opportunity to be heard, and
avenue for review, is not at issue here. It is assumed that any program would include
the requisite procedural safeguards. The susceptibility, if any, of limited entry to a
due process challenge lies in the legislative motive and justification for the program.
See generally, CAMERON, supra note 29, at 7-11.
52. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
53. The Court noted in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955):
"The day is gone whcn this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought."
54. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US. 564 (1972); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972);
Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097, 1114
(1973).
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withstood due process attack. In Corsa v. Tawes,55 a three-judge federal
district court upheld a Maryland statute" prohibiting the use of purse
nets in the state's tidal waters. Net fishing is the only economical way
to catch menhaden, an inedible species used for fish oil and fish meal.
The prohibition of nets was justified as a conservation measure and as
necessary to the protection of Maryland's sport fisheries, a considerable
industry in the state.17 Although the effect was to eliminate the com-
mercial menhaden industry in Maryland waters, the court found no
constitutional impediment to this legislative policy. The state had a legiti-
mate objective, and the means chosen were found to be reasonable; 8
due process required no more.
Taking
A challenge to limited entry under the theory of a taking 59 would
be illusory, for fishermen excluded by limited entry have no property
right taken from them by the program. They have no property interest
in the resource, which belongs to the state,"0 and no legally cognizable
interest in the right to fish. Where fishermen have challenged a regula-
tion which has the effect of rendering their equipment valueless, they
have not succeeded.81
The trend of authority on the taking issue supports resource control
legislation on the theory that the public benefit sought to be obtained
outweighs private detriment suffered by individuals; this has been the
analysis in cases where the property interest of the claimant was a
55. 149 F.S..upp. 771 (D. Md.), aff'd, 355 U.S. 37 (1957).
56. MD. ANN. CODE Art. 66C, § 259 (1951).
57. 149 F. Supp. at 772, 776. Corsa is distinguishable from Puyallup Tribe v. Wash-
ington Game Dep't, 414 U.S. 44 (1973), discussed supra, at note 50, in that treaty
rights were not at issue. Thus, in the absence of special treat)' rights, the court held
that the Maryland legislature was free to act to preserve sporr fishing at the expense
of commercial fishing.
58. 149 F. Supp. at 776. The court found that the total prohibition of nets was
reasonable because it would be too burdensome to police a regulation that allowed
menhaden nets but no other nets.
59. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE TAKINGS IssuE 284-301 (1973); Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comnents on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Com-
pensation" Lav, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.
149 (1971).
60. But cf. Dobard v. State, 233 S.XV.2d 435, 439 (Tex. 1950) (state not owner of
fish in marginal sea).
61. Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261 (1930); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894).
[Vol. 17:757
FISHERY REGULATION
traditional ownership interest.62 In a limited entry situation, a claimant
on a taking theory has a dubious property interest being "taken"; it is
therefore unlikely that such a theory would succeed.
LIMITED ENTRY ALTERNATIVES
As illustrated above, the exclusion inherent in limited entry does not
face an absolute constitutional prohibition. Using the standards cus-
tomarily applied when economic or resource regulations are subjected
to constitutional challenge, there is no inherent obstacle to the limited
entry concept. With convincing documentation of need, careful drafting
to avoid discriminatory classifications, and procedurally fair adminis-
tration, a program constitutionally can restrict access to a fishery.
A limited entry program may be implemented through the use of
licenses, stock certificates, or user fees. Two legal considerations underlie
implementation of each of these alternatives. First, by closing access to
a fishery, limited entry creates a new form of property in the right to
fish; the attributes of property which this right will carry must be
thoroughly defined. This property, the right to fish, will acquire an
independent, quantifiable value.0 3 Treatment of this independent value
also must be anticipated by the program, although this is largely a policy
problem.64
62. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (involving a
land owner prohibited from excavating gravel by a regulation forbidding excavation
below the water table); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761
(1972) (involving land owners deprived of use of their land by wetland regulations).
In such cases, the plaintiff challengers had an actual, present property interest.
63. For example, in the British Columbia salmon limited entry program, the value
of the fishing privilege is S1,900 per ton of vessel ($47,500 for a 25-ton vessel). U .S.
DEP'T OF CO.MMIERCE. N'AT'. OCEANIC AND AT.MOSPHERIC ADM'N, NAT'L MARINE FISH-
ERIES SERVICE, A DRAFT OUTLINE FOR THE. NATIONAL FISHERIES PLAN 215 (1974) [herein-
after cited as DRAFT NATIONAL .MARINE FISHERIES PLAN].
64. The value of the right to fish is called economic rent. It represents a recapture
of the economic waste that is dissipated in a common property fishery. See note 4
supra. Limited entry enables extraction of this economic value, because when access
is limited, market forces dictate that people will pay value for the right to enter.
One policy question concerns whether limited entry programs should be designed
to allow fishermen to receive part of the economic rent in lieu of the government.
It could be argued that fishermen who must buy the right to fish initially should be
allowed to sell that right when they want to leave the fishery to recoup their original
investment. On the other hand, the fishermen derive a benefit from being in a limited
entry program; they are able to harvest the same amount (or more) at lower costs
because there are fewer fishermen. Allowing them to profit from any increase in the
value of the right to fish gives the fishermen a windfall. The government creates the
value by creating the limited entry program. If the government collects all the eco-
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The second area of legal concern revolves around allocation and
distribution of the newly created property. The benefits of the program
must be distributed equitably within the constitutional standards of due
process and equal protection. 5 Each of the alternative implementation
methods represents a slightly different resolution of the two problems
presented by creation of a new form of property in the right to fish.
Licenses
Present fishery management employs licenses in both commercial and
sport fisheries. Absent a license, a person generally cannot participate,
but, unlike limited entry, the aim of traditional licensing is not control
through exclusion. Traditional licensing is a way of financing adminis-
tration of fisheries laws.60 Limited entry licensing seeks to control exploi-
tation of the fishery by restricting the amount of fishing effort applied.
The theory is simple; if fewer fishing units participate, it is reasonable
to expect that fewer fish will be taken.
nomic rent, it is the equivalent of paying the owner of an item for the privilege of
using it; for example, renting land to farm, or buying mineral rights. The money col-
lected could be used in fishery management, aquaculture or mariculture.
Because the right to fish has a value, fishermen wishing to gain access to an entry
will have to pay either the government or fishermen who own and are willing to sell
sutch a right. If the government wishes to receive all of this value, several avenues are
open. The fee for a license or stock certificate could be set at an amount equal to
the full economic rent; a user fee could be set the same way. The licenses or cer-
tificates would then be traded only through the management agency, and the full value
would be charged at transfer. Alternatively, to lessen initial impact, the rent could
be extracted over the lifetime of the license in the form of a property tax. If society
decided to allow fishermen to retain part of this value, any tax could be set at less
than full economic rent. See generally F. CHRISTY, FISHERMEN QUOTAS: A TENTATIVE
SUGGESTON FOR DoMEmsfc MANAGEMENr (Occasional Paper Series No. 19, Law of the
Sea Inst., Univ. of R.I. 1973) [hereinafter cited as F. CHRISTY, FISHERMEN QuOTAs].
65. A state limited entry plan, in contrast to a federal plan, may be constrained
by state constitutional provisions. Limited entry in Alaska, for example, required a
constitutional amendment modifying an article that had prohibited exclusive rights
in fisheries. ALASKA CONSr. art. 8, § 15. Other states constitutionally prohibit monopolies
(M). CoNsr. Decl. of Rights, art. 41) or special laws granting exclusive rights (VA.
CoN sT. art. 4, § 14 [18]).
66. Present fishery management includes, depending on the fishery, one or more
of these categories of regulation: (a) control on size of catch, to ensure recruits for
subsequent years; (b) control of locations (area closures), to protect seed beds, or
spawning grounds, or for health reasons; (c) limits on seasons (seasonal closures), to
limit overall catch, or to protect young or mating seasons; (d) enforced quotas, such
as catch limits on some species or total bans on endangered species. If limited entry
was implemented, traditional regulations affecting size limits, area closures, or seasons
might still be necessary, depending on the fishery. There is no reason why a tradi-
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In theory, the management agency would make several determina-
tions. First, the sustainable yield from the resource that would produce
the maximum economic rent would be ascertained.6 7 Second, an appro-
priate unit of fishing effort would be isolated. Finally, only the number
of units of effort that would harvest the established yield would be
tional management method cannot be used in conjunction with a limited entry
program.
67. To be distinguished from the MSY is the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY);
MSY focuses on the reproductive capacity of the species, while MEY focuses on the
monetary value of the resource. The difference can be illustrated graphically:
I costs mcludmg
- .economic rent
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O.A. (open access) = level of landings in an unregulated fishery, solely a function
of supply and demand.
MSY = point at which supply curve peaks, after which the stocks will begin to
decline in size.
MEY = level of landings at which economic rent can be maximized.
See Copes, The Backward-Bending Supply Curve of the Fishing Industry, 17 ScOT. J.
POLIT. EcoN, 69, 77 (1970). To avoid economic waste and to enable recapture of the
lost rents, the management agency should use the MEY standard rather than MSY.
See generally notes 4, 64 supra.
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licensed. A serious technical problem, however, would exist in decid-
ing what unit of fishing effort to license. Fishing effort is a function of
three factors: the power of the gear (or vessel), number of vessels, and
time spent fishing. 68 Thus, for example, if the program licenses only a
limited number of vessels, the goal of maintaining the fishery can be
undercut by an increase in power of the gear or time spent fishing.69
Alternatively, if the program licenses only certain kinds of gear to con-
trol power, a fishery can become locked into existing inefficiencies, and
improvements are discouraged. 70 It is difficult and administratively
expensive to attempt a licensing program that successfully integrates
all elements of fishing effort to control the catch.71
Despite the potential for economic inefficiency, licensing for limited
entry has political appeal, as evidenced by programs in Alaska72 and
Washington,75 perhaps because it does not seem to depart from tradi-
tional management. Both Alaska and Washington limit the amount of
gear (nets) operating in specified locations.74 Quite obviously, where
excess gear or any other single element of fishing effort can be isolated
as a contributing and manageable problem, a licensing program is most
likely to be successful. 75
68. F. CHRISTY, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 1, at 33.
69. Regulations of fishing effort have been called the "leaky bucket" technique.
If there is a village well with a limited flow, there are no problems as
long as the water drawn from the well is no greater than the rate of re-
plenishment. But, if the demand for water increases beyond that point, one
solution is to punch holes in the bottom of each person's bucket.
Id. at 32.
70. Power, More About Oysters Than You Wanted to Know, 30 MD. L. REv. 199,
208-09 (1970).
71. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADM'N, NAT'L
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, FINAL DRAFT, NATIONAL PLAN FOR MARINE FISHERIES § 3.2,
at 53-54 (1975).
72. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-16.43.380 (1973).
73. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 75.28.390-.440, 75.28.450-.485 (1974).
74. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.100 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 75.28.455 (1974). An
anadromous specie like salmon spawns inland in rivers and then swims far out in the
high seas. They return each year in "runs" to specific spawning grounds. The state
of Washington operates hatcheries for salmon in its rivers. As the salmon runs return
to spawn, it is possible to evaluate how much of the run should be permitted to swim
up the river to spawn and how much can be taken without depleting the stocks. This
estimate is made when the salmon are in the bays and mouths of rivers; it is this
location that is regulated by limited entry. Salmon are taken only in an amount that
permits the proper escapement upriver to spawn. See United States v. Washington,
384 F. Supp. 312, 390 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
75. ALASKA, GOVERNOR'S STUDY GROUP ON LIMITED ENTRY, REPORT: A LIMITED ENTRY
PROGRAM FOR ALASKA'S FIssamEs 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ALASKA, GOVERNOR'S
STUDY GROUP].
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Having identified the unit to limit, a program must provide for dis-
tribution of the licenses. The Alaska program, for example, has a care-
fully structured allocation system.76 Initially, maximum permissible gear
is determined in a neutral atmosphere; the management agency considers
economic and biological data and surveys the fishing industry by locali-
ties to determine what levels of gear would be considered reasonable by
people in each area. 7 After this analysis, applications for entry permits
are taken. By statute, interim entry permits are issued to all applicants
who can "establish their present ability to participate actively in the
fishery." 7' The standard is applied through the use of a cutoff date,
making all those who hold licenses before the cutoff eligible for interim
limited entry permits.-," Since the holders of interim entry permits con-
stitute the class that will qualify for permanent entry licenses, it is essen-
tial that there be no unreasonable discrimination in the allocation of in-
terim permits. Vith any limited entry program, as in Alaska, categories
must take effect at some point in time. If the categories are reasonable
and relate to the aim of the program, the temporal element should not
defeat the program.
Distribution of permanent entry rights must satisfy equal protection.
Under the Alaska statute, priority classifications of similarly situated
applicants are based upon two factors: the degree of economic depend-
ence upon the fishery and the extent of past participation in the fishery."0
Such an allocation system is reasonably related to the aim of the statute,
that is, protecting the livelihood of fishermen as well as the fish stocks. In
application, the program will not treat everyone who wants to fish the
76. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.150-.160 (1973). In Washington, the distribution is left
to regulations. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 75.28.420, .455 (1974).
77. ALASKA, GOVERNOR'S STunY GROUP, supra note 75, at 3.
78. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.210(a) (1973).
79. The statute was amended to provide a cutoff date, ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.260(a)
(1974), after which there was a rush of applications for licenses to fish salmon. See
Isakson v. State, Civ. No. 75-31, at 4 (Sup. Ct. Alas., filed May 5, 1975). The program
has been challenged by fishermen who were willing and able to participate but did
not hold licenses before the cutoff date. Isakson v. State, supra. The plaintiffs lost
in the lower state court and are appealing to the state supreme court. Their theory
on appeal is that use of the cutoff date unreasonably discriminates in violation of
e4ual protection and due process, because it is not related to the statute's aim of
preventing hardship in the fishing industry. The cutoff date, they asserr, arbitrarily
excludes some who otherwise would satisfy the statute, and includes license holders
who might not satisfy the statute because they actually had not participated in the
fishing although they held licenses. Brief of Appellants at 36-38, Isakson v. State,
Supreme Court File No. 2550 (filed Sept. 1975).
80. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.250 (1973).
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same, but the classifications of potential entrants that will be made will
relate to the aim of aiding Alaska's commercial fisheries.
To satisfy equal protection, an allocation system could detail priority
characteristics, as does the Alaska statute. A blind allocation system,
such as a lottery,8' also would treat all potential entrants equally. A
lottery may be politically unattractive, however, when a participant's
livelihood and substantial investment in gear is made to depend on pure
chance. A third allocation system would be a sale or auction. Since
the right to fish will acquire value, it is not unreasonable to expect the
users to buy that right. 2
The licensing program must define the boundaries of the property
nature of the license. Because the aim of the program is maintenance
of fishing industries and stocks, some controls on alienation of the licenses
should exist.83 If they could be exchanged freely like other property,
speculation in the resource could result, to the detriment of the fishing
industry. In addition, licenses could devolve into the hands of a few fish-
ing units, giving rise to the charge that the program inequitably excludes
and also creates a monopoly. Some trading of licenses should be allowed,
however, to encourage efficient units to expand and to enable other
units to sell out of the fishery. License transfer could be subject to the
approval of the management agency,84 or licenses could be transferred
only to and by the agency. In either case, the program should assure
that parties with no intent or ability to participate in the fishery do
not hold licenses.
The program should contemplate how the license will be treated upon
the death of the holder. Alaska, for example, allows the license to be
inherited,8 5 but it is unclear whether the taker after death must also
qualify as a holder under the statute. Allowing unfettered transfer at
death might lead to the same difficulties that free alienability during
lifetime creates. A better system would include an automatic "buy-
back" upon the death of the holder.
81. Participation in salmon fishing in the mouth of Minter Creek in Washington
is determined by a drawing open to any licensed purse seiner who applies. United
States v. Vashington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 390 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
82. See note 64 supra and note 92 infra & accompanying text.
83. In Washington, they are freely transferrable. WASH. REV. CODE, §§ 75.28.420, .455
(1974).
84. In Alaska, entry permits may be transferred subject to the approval of the
management agency, and the transferee must qualify to hold under the statute in his
own right. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.170 (1973). See note 72 supra.
85. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.180(b) (1973). No comparable provision exists in the Wash-
ington statute.
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Within the same framework of limited alienability, the licenses should
be exempt froim attachment by creditors and should not be used as
security for debts, of the holder.s8 Although there is ascertainable and
marketable value in the licenses, these controls harmonize with the
requirement that any taker of a license qualify as a holder.
In summary, allocation of the licenses must be reasonable to satisfy
equal protection. Characterization of the property interest in the license
is largely a policy question, but the definitions will impact on the sub-
sequent allocation of the licenses and must be formulated to assure that
the operation of the program does not have a discriminatory effect or a
result inconsistent with the original aim of the legislation.
Stock Certificates
The stock certificate17 method of limiting entry focuses on the
resource and distributes rights to a portion of the fishery. Fishermen
would receive a share (stock certificate) representing a fixed percentage
of the allowable catch. The fishing unit could take only its share, but it
could use any methods preferred. Innovation and efficiency would be
encouraged because the fisherman would know that a set amount of
the resource was "reserved" for him.88
From an economic standpoint, using stock certificates avoids the
inefficiencies of licensing, because there is no attempt to control fishing
effort.8 9 The legal considerations of a stock certificate program are
86. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(g) (1973). No comparable provision exists in the
Washington statute.
87. See generally F. CHRISTY, FISHERMAN QUOTAS, supra note 64; A. LAING, COMMENT
ON OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 19 (Occasional Paper Series, Law of the Sea Inst., Univ. of
R.I. 1973). A similar program exists in international fisheries in the form of national
quotas; the British also have employed fishermen quotas in deep sea fisheries. A.
LAING, COMMENT ON- OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 19 (Occasional Paper Series, Law of the
Sea Inst., Univ. of R.I. 1973).
88. F. CHRISTY, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 1, at 30-31. Merely setting
total quotas can preserve stocks but is economically inefficient for various reasons.
Participants will rush to get as much as they can before the quota iq filled. The result
is over-investment. In addition, the season will shorten. For example, in Pacific halibut
the season dropped from seven months to three weeks in one regulatory area, and
from nine months to less than two months in other areas. F. CHRISTY & A. ScoTT, THE
COMMONWEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 14-15 (1965). Pressure is put on facilities of
processors and distributors; the increased supply also can cause a drop in price to the
fishermen. F. CHRISTY, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 1, at 31. The aim of
giving shares in the total catch is to avoid the adverse economic consequences of
simply setting a quota.
89. F. CHRISTY, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 1, at 32.
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essentially the same as a license program; the program must observe the
same precautions with respect to allocation of the stock certificates, and
treatment of the property element in the right to fish similarly must be
anticipated.
A stock certificate plan, however, could be utilized to give the fish-
erman more than a right to take a certain share of the catch. In addition
to distributing a right to take, the certificates could represent a property
right in the fish before they are taken. Although property law tradi-
tionally recognizes no ownership rights in wild animals while free,"0 a
limited entry program could assign to a certificate holder any rights
which the state had in the free swimming resource. This would give the
holder a vested interest in the resource and its conservation. Under such
a theory, damage to the resource by pollution or illegal taking would be
actionable by the certificate holders as well as by (or instead of) the
state.9' Under current theories of law, fishermen have no interest in fish
resources before they are caught; if pollution damages a species, the
fishermen have no action. In theory, the state can sue the polluter for
injury to its property, but there is a complex problem of measuring
damages. The injury to fish may cause the state little measurable dam-
age, although certain industries, like fishing, would have direct and quan-
tifiable losses. Even if the state measured its damages as the loss of a
commercial fishing catch, the recovery would not inure to the benefit
of the parties actually injured.
Recognizing a property interest in the free swimming resource might
encourage private enforcement of resource protection laws. It would
also, however, give the fisherman an interest that the state would there-
after be required to respect. The fisherman's right in the resource could
not be taken away without due process; under this theory of ownership
in the resource, the fisherman would have sufficient interest in the free
swimming resource to support a due process or taking claim if the law
were changed to deprive him of his share. Of course, this right is
largely theoretical, because under the stock certificate plan the holder
has rights only in his share of the allowable catch; if no catch is allowed
because of purely economic or ecological reasons, no deprivation of
property would exist.
90. Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines 175 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1805).
91. Precisely characterizing what the certificate would assign is largely a policy mat-
ter. The state would probably want to relinquish no more than a leasehold, that is, it
would want to retain a substantial reversionary interest in the free swimming re-
source. The terms for the reverter, violation of regulations, for instance, could be
enumerated.
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It is unlikely that a stock certificate plan would attempt to create
rights in the resource before it is taken because that would be such a
radical concept in fishery management. The stock certificate program as
a right to take a certain share of the total catch, on the other hand, is
a feasible alternative. It is similar to licensing and yet eliminates many
of the inefficiencies of a licensing program.
User Fees
Under a user fee program, there is no instrument representing the
right to fish. Access is open, but all participants are taxed on their catch.
The theory92 is that this tax, or user fee, will extract the economic rent
that is lost in inefficient fisheries by charging participants at a rate that
recaptures the economic waste.93 Inefficient units will be unable to pay
the tax and will leave the fishery, and new entry by inefficient units
will be discouraged. This will allow the fishery to reach an economically
and biologically efficient equilibrium that can be monitored by adjust-
ments in the rate of taxation.
The user fee is a radical approach to fishery management. The tech-
nical obstacle lies in computation of a fee that accurately extracts the
economic rent. The program faces strong political objections because
of a severe impact upon introduction of the tax theory, though the user
fee asks the fishing industry to do only what other resource industries
do: pay for the use of the resource. If a mechanism could be devised to
spread the burden of implementation beyond the first generation of tax-
payers, 4 and if the long-term benefits of stability can be demonstrated
clearly, the user fee represents a relatively simple management scheme. It
would have low administrative costs, 5 would not disrupt the patterns of
fishing, and would sustain an atmosphere for initiative and growth of effi-
cient fishing units.
The program represents a tax for a regulatory purpose. As a general
rule, such taxes will be upheld as long as a revenue-raising motive,
92. See F. CHRIsTY, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 1, at 35-38; Copes, The
Backward-Be'nding Supply Curve of the Fishing Industry, 17 ScoT. J. Porr. EcoN. 69,
76 (1970). As illustrated in note 64 supra, all or part of the economic rent can be
extracted by the user fee.
93. See note 64 supra.
94. For example, the program could freeze the fishery at present participation and
tax new entrants, or the tax could increase gradually over time to enable participants
to adjust and anticipate the increment in cost. F. Cmusry, ALTmRATIVE AmANGEMENTS,
supra note 1, at 38.
95. F. CHRisry, FIsHERmAN QUOTAS, supra note 64, at 5.
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though secondary"° or insubstantial, 7 appears on the face of the
statute.9 8 Due process ,attacks on such a tax have been rejected by the
Supreme Court, though the effect of the tax may be to eliminate a par-
ticular business. 99 The Court has noted, however, that in "rare and spe-
cial instances" due process may be invoked where the tax is "so arbitrary
as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the
taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct exer-
tion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example, the confiscation
of property." 100 Although no recent case illustrates this exception, the
type of program that might be invalidated was suggested by Justice
Powell, concurring in Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp.10 1
It is conceivable ... that punitive taxation of a private industry and
direct economic competition through a governmental entity enjoy-
ing special competitive advantages would effectively expropriate a
private business for public profit. Such a combination of unreason-
ably burdensome taxation and public competition would be the
functional equivalent of a governmental taking of private property
for public use and would be subject to the constitutional require-
ment of just compensation. 02
The significant factor in Powell's concurrence is the concomitant pres-
ence of government competition with a prohibitory tax; such a com-
bination has the effect of taxing to condemn for public use. Absent
government participation in the fishing business, limited entry taxation
would not fit this category; additionally, limited entry does not antici-
pate ultimate government ownership of the fishing industry as a result
of the tax.
96. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
97. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
98. Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1974); United States
v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950); Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934);
Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1921); United
States v. Ross, 458 F.2d' 1144, 1145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 868 (1972).
99. Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 373-75 (1974); Alaska Fish
Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921); McCray v. United States,
195 US. 27 (1904).
100. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934).
101. 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
102. Id. at 379. In Pittsburgh v. Alco, the city taxed private off-street parking lots
at a rate that had the effect of pricing them out of competition with city meters. The
aim was to discourage downtown automobile traffic, and encourage use of other
transportation. The facts of the case make it close to the "tax plus public competi-
tion" that Justice Powell describes. Yet he concurred in upholding the regulation
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In addition to a due process challenge, a limited entry user fee may
face challenge under the equal protection clause. The burden of the
program would fall on the least efficient fishermen; thus, allocation of
the right to fish arguably would be based on the ability to pay.' The
status of, poverty or wealth as a classification under the equal protection
clause is unclear.°,4 Wealth as a classification has been deemed to be
"inherently disfavored", 10 but it is not treated in the same manner as
traditionally suspect classifications such as race or religion. Cases in
which the Supreme Court has voided statutes on the basis of wealth
discrimination have involved criminal .protections, 00 or such basic
rights as the right to vote '(7 and the right to travel.,' Unlike some state
courts,"' in determining whether a-right has been infringed, the Court
has not deemed a wealth-based classification a crucial factor contributing
to the imposition of a strict scrutiny test.1 0 Thus, when examining an
alleged deprivation of the right to housing,'"' education," 2 and welfare
benefits,"8 , the Court refused-to apply the test.
An additional obstacle facing a "wealth-based" challenge is the argu-
ment that the limited entry fee statute does not in fact utilize a wealth-
based classification. It could be argued that because efficiency does not
necessarily depend upon capital- investment, a mixed group of various
as a valid exercise of the police power. It is hard to conceive of a fact pattern Justice
Powell would condemn under his test.
103. Because the least efficient fishermen would, be eliminated from the market and
because efficiency is often a function of capital investment it might be argued that
allocation of the right to fish under the program was based on a wealth classification.
But see text accompanying note 115 infra.
104. See Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Anendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7
HARv. CiV. RicGts-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 103 (1972). The relevant question for limited
entry fees is whether such charges would trigger strict scrutiny of the program.
105. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
106. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
107. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (0972 ) Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
'108. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
109. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
110. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
111. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
112. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
113. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
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business entities 14 with differing capital contributions would be denied
access under the program. Such a result would evidence an efficiency-
based classification rather than one based on wealth." 5
Recognizing that the Supreme Court "has never.., held that wealth
discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict
scrutiny," 116 it finally could be argued that the limited entry user fee
program deprives individuals of a fundamental right: the right to occu-
pational choice. In light of the fact, however, that such rights as the
right to education or housing have not been deemed fundamental,""
and because the Court traditionally has used a rational basis test in
examining state restrictions on occupational choice,118 it is clear that the
right to occupational choice is not fundamental.
The user fee could be more than nominally justified as a revenue-
raising measure. Aside from coping with the problems of exploitation
of fisheries and overinvestment of segments of the fishing industry, funds
generated from the program could aid in relocating displaced fishermen
114. Assuming arguendo that a user fee program did classify on the basis of wealth,
it nonetheless seems clear that such a mixed group would not be protected by the
strict scrutiny test. In the analogous case of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court declined to find discrimination on the basis
of wealth in the financing of public schools through use of a property tax. Address-
ing the question of whether the state could disburse funds to districts according to
their property tax base, the Court stated:
[lit is clear that appellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting
scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large,
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of resi-
dence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines
have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful un-
equal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.
Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). Under this view it is difficult to formulate a class affected
by a limited entry user fee that would be recognized.
115. Moreover, it is difficult to proceed on a theory of discriminatory' effect in the
face of the strong line of precedent under due process that regulatory taxes with
exclusionary effects are valid. See notes 96-98 supra. In addition, it is especially difficult
to impute a discriminatory effect from a pricing policy intended to distribute a scarce
resource. Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Serv-
ices, and Wealth, 7 HARV. Cirv. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 103, 138-39. (1972).
116. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
117. See notes 111, 112 supra & accompanying text.
118. See, e.g, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Co, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
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and developing new fisheries.1 19 And, as illustrated, although the user
fee is a new idea in fishery management, similar regulatory taxes and
programs for distributing government benefits on the basis of ability
to pay have withstood challenge. There is thus no reason, within the
present scope of due process and equal protection law, why a user fee
in fisheries would not be upheld as well.
CONCLUSION
Limited entry fishery management offers an opportunity to regulate
fishery resources for the benefit of the fishing industry and society in
general, as well as to prevent depletion of the stocks. Because it repre-
sents a new view of commercial fishing, restricting access to what was
previously freely available, it raises the question of whether there are
any constitutional objections to restructuring the legal nature of the
fishery. Because neither the abstract concept of exclusion nor the par-
ticular methods of implementing limited entry differ in any legally
significant way from regulations of business and natural resources that
have been upheld, it would seem that limited entry fishery management
is a viable alternative to open access fishing. The major problems facing
limited entry are not legal but rather practical and political; it will be
difficult to convince the fishing industry that regulation of this nature is
necessary and beneficial.
119. For example, limited entry proposals for the surf clam fishery, see ALTaERAm
AIANAGEMENT SCHEMES FOR SVURF CLAsS, supra note 22, include suggestions to subsidize
the development of an ocean quahog fishery. The effort that is directed, away from
the overexploited surf clams would be redirected toward ocean quahogs, presently
not commercially exploited. While there are over 2,000 species of fish in U. S. coastal
waters, only about 170 finfish species and 50 shellfish species are commercially landed.
About 50 species of finfish make up over 90 percent of the commercial landings by
weight. DRAFT NATiONAL MARINE FISHERIES PLAN, supra note 63, at 8.
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